

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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11 April 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence)

FROM:

[Redacted]  
Executive Secretary, SIG(I)

SUBJECT: Meeting - 19 April 1984

1. The SIG(I) will meet on Thursday, 19 April 1984 at 1400 hours in [Redacted] (Room 6W02). The meeting will be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence; attendance will be principals plus one (optional). It is urged that each principal attend.

2. The following items will be addressed:

-- NSDD-84 Personnel Security Review. (Paper attached)

-- Request for Policy Guidance on Intelligence  
[Redacted] (This paper was forwarded to you in January 1984)

-- Hostile Intelligence Threat Assessment -- Tabs F, G, and H only. (Paper attached)

3. Please confirm your attendance by contacting the Executive Secretary [Redacted] by 1200 hours, 18 April 1984.

Attachments  
As Stated

Distribution:

Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Deputy Secretary of State  
Deputy Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subject: SIG(I) Meeting, 19 April 1984

Distribution: IC/84/7650

Attachments: NSDD-84: Safeguarding National Security Information;  
Status Report on 1983 National Assessment and Recommendations  
re Hostile Intelligence Threat and U.S. Countermeasures

- 1 - DCI
- 2 - DDCI
- 3 - NSC (K. deGraffenreid for Mr. McFarlane)
- 4 - Department of State (H. Montgomery for Deputy Secretary Damm)
- 5 - Department of Defense (LTC R. Higgins for Deputy Secretary Taft)
- 6 - Joint Chiefs of Staff (VADM A. Moreau for General Vessey)
- 7 - Director, ICS [redacted]
- 8 - Executive Registry
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- 11 - SIG(I) Subject
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ES/SIG(I): [redacted] /4/11/84

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March 11, 1983


MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR  
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES  
THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT  
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION  
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY  
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT  
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE  
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY  
BOARD  
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD  
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS  
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION  
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY  
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE  
ADMINISTRATION  
ADMINISTRATOR, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION  
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT  
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE

SUBJECT: NSDD-84: Safeguarding National Security Information

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on safeguarding national security information. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall distribute copies of the Directive to any agency not listed above that originates or handles national security information.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

Attachment

NSDD-84

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1983

National Security Decision  
Directive Number 84

Safeguarding National Security Information

As stated in Executive Order 12356, only that information whose disclosure would harm the national security interests of the United States may be classified. Every effort should be made to declassify information that no longer requires protection in the interest of national security.

At the same time, however, safeguarding against unlawful disclosures of properly classified information is a matter of grave concern and high priority for this Administration. In addition to the requirements set forth in Executive Order 12356, and based on the recommendations contained in the interdepartmental report forwarded by the Attorney General, I direct the following:

1. Each agency of the Executive Branch that originates or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures to safeguard against unlawful disclosures of classified information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide as follows:

a. All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access. This requirement may be implemented prospectively by agencies for which the administrative burden of compliance would otherwise be excessive.

b. All persons with authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to SCI and other classified information. All such agreements must include a provision for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other classified information.

c. All agreements required in paragraphs 1.a. and 1.b. must be in a form determined by the Department of Justice to be enforceable in a civil action brought by the United States. The Director, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), shall develop standardized forms that satisfy these requirements.

d. Appropriate policies shall be adopted to govern contacts between media representatives and agency personnel, so as to reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate disclosures of classified information. All persons with authorized access to classified information shall be clearly apprised of the agency's policies in this regard.

2. Each agency of the Executive branch that originates or handles classified information shall adopt internal procedures to govern the reporting and investigation of unauthorized disclosures of such information. Such procedures shall at a minimum provide that:

a. All such disclosures that the agency considers to be seriously damaging to its mission and responsibilities shall be evaluated to ascertain the nature of the information disclosed and the extent to which it had been disseminated.

b. The agency shall conduct a preliminary internal investigation prior to or concurrently with seeking investigative assistance from other agencies.

c. The agency shall maintain records of disclosures so evaluated and investigated.

d. Agencies in the possession of classified information originating with another agency shall cooperate with the originating agency by conducting internal investigations of the unauthorized disclosure of such information.

e. Persons determined by the agency to have knowingly made such disclosures or to have refused cooperation with investigations of such unauthorized disclosures will be denied further access to classified information and subjected to other administrative sanctions as appropriate.


3. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information shall be reported to the Department of Justice and the Information Security Oversight Office, as required by statute and Executive orders. The Department of Justice shall continue to review reported unauthorized disclosures of classified information to determine whether FBI investigation is warranted. Interested departments and agencies shall be consulted in developing criteria for evaluating such matters and in determining which cases should receive investigative priority. The FBI is authorized to investigate such matters as constitute potential violations of federal criminal law, even though administrative sanctions may be sought instead of criminal prosecution.

4. Nothing in this directive is intended to modify or preclude interagency agreements between FBI and other criminal investigative agencies regarding their responsibility for conducting investigations within their own agencies or departments.

5. The Office of Personnel Management and all departments and agencies with employees having access to classified information are directed to revise existing regulations and policies, as necessary, so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph examinations, when appropriate, in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. As a minimum, such regulations shall permit an agency to decide that appropriate

adverse consequences will follow an employee's refusal to cooperate with a polygraph examination that is limited in scope to the circumstances of the unauthorized disclosure under investigation. Agency regulations may provide that only the head of the agency, or his delegate, is empowered to order an employee to submit to a polygraph examination. Results of polygraph examinations should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other information obtained during investigations.

6. The Attorney General, in consultation with the Director, Office of Personnel Management, is requested to establish an interdepartmental group to study the federal personnel security program and recommend appropriate revisions in existing Executive orders, regulations, and guidelines.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "David Rogers". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "D" and "R".

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## The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

TAB E

25 March 1983

The Honorable William P. Clark  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

This is a further progress report on the work of the Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence) [SIG(I)] in developing implementation of the policy and legal actions identified in the NSSD-2 study to counter the hostile intelligence threat. Of the 106 recommended actions, 72 are resource actions on which a strong beginning has been established in the FY-84 budget and guidance for the FY-85 budget.

Of the 34 policy and legal measures recommended in the NSSD-2 study, 12 were assigned to an Interagency Group for Counterintelligence (IG/CI) chaired by FBI Director Webster and 22 to an Interagency Group for Countermeasures (IG/CM) chaired by General Stilwell.

The SIG(I) has unanimously approved seven proposals developed by the IG/CI to limit the hostile presence in the United States. They are indicated at Tab 1. A proposed NSDD developed by the IG/CM to control foreign civil overflights of the United States is at Tab 2. These are forwarded with my approval and endorsement.

The IG/CI developed ten other proposals to limit the hostile presence. All of these proposals on limiting the hostile presence are analyzed in depth in a study submitted for your information at Tab 3. A consensus was not achieved on these measures with most of the members desirous of taking full action to reduce the hostile threat, State holding that if implemented at this time the merit of these actions would be outweighed by their adverse impact on the near-term goals and effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The SIG(I) recognizes the value of these ten proposals; however, in certain instances some SIG(I) members have expressed reservations based on their concerns that retaliatory measures might be imposed by foreign governments which could, for example, impact on U.S. foreign intelligence collection and commercial enterprises abroad. Each of these proposals and positions--for or against--held currently by SIG(I) members are described at Tab 4. While I recognize Judge Webster's compelling support for these proposals, I defer to Secretary Shultz' concerns and recommend that no action be taken on these proposals at this time.

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
At Tab 5, I enclose a report on the status of 11 other projects assigned to the IG/CI.

At Tab 6, there is a report on the status of 15 other proposals assigned to IG/CM.

You will note that recommendations on several of these proposals are promised over the next few weeks and they will promptly, where appropriate, be brought before the SIG(I) for deliberation and forwarded to you.

The organizational phase of the NSSD-2 study has been under way in the IG/CI and IG/CM since January. Their work is scheduled for completion in May and their recommendations will be promptly considered by the SIG(I) and reported to you for appropriate action.

Yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'William J. Casey', with a large, stylized flourish extending from the end of the signature.

William J. Casey

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